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ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW IN CHINA: 
A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY WRESTLES WITH ITS 
ANTITRUST REGIME 
 
Jared A. Berry∗ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In many ways, it appears that 2008 will be a momentous year 
for China. For a few weeks that summer, Beijing will become the 
focal point of the world, as athletes, media, and sports fans from 
around the world converge on the capital city for the Olympic 
Games. While the excitement surrounding the Beijing Olympics is 
well-founded, the Chinese business and legal community eagerly 
anticipates 2008 for another, less obvious, reason—the possible 
implementation of China’s proposed antitrust regime. For well over 
ten years, China has worked on developing its first set of 
comprehensive antitrust laws. Finally, in late 2004, legislative 
drafters took the first crucial step towards enactment by submitting 
a draft Anti-Monopoly Law to the State Council’s Legislative 
Affairs Office. This submission has many Chinese politicians, 
lawyers, and judges feeling optimistic that an anti-monopoly law 
will be in place when the world comes to China in 2008.  
This note describes the long, arduous process that China has 
faced in attempting to enact an antitrust regime and analyzes the 
current antitrust landscape in Communist China. Part II provides an 
overview of the evolution of China’s economy and legal system, 
including a detailed examination of events that have influenced the 
creation and submission in 2004 of the new proposed Anti-
Monopoly Law. Part III addresses the likely effects of the proposed 
Anti-Monopoly Law and analyzes the probability of it successfully 
accomplishing its stated goals of regulating multinational 
corporations and reforming state-owned enterprises and 
administrative monopolies. Part III also emphasizes challenges, 
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both external and internal, that could emasculate the proposed law’s 
ability to reach its stated goals and suggestions that could facilitate 
effective implementation of antitrust reform in China. Finally, Part 
IV summarizes the author’s concerns with communist China’s 
ability to effectively implement antitrust. The author concludes that 
unless Beijing experiences major philosophical changes, China’s 
attempts at regulating monopoly will be unsuccessful. 
 
II. BACKGROUND: CHINA AND ANTITRUST LAW 
 
A. Evolution of the Modern Chinese Legal System 
 
During the past century, the role of the judiciary within the 
Chinese legal system has experienced significant changes. In fact, 
throughout history, judicial institutions in China have struggled to 
find their identity. Traditional Chinese notions of justice emphasize 
informal means of settling disputes and imposing sanctions.1 As a 
consequence, the philosophies of Confucianism often trumped the 
law.2 In 1949 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ousted the 
Nationalist government and took control of China. The leaders of 
the CCP had struggled for many years against local warlords, 
Nationalist strife, and foreign imperialism.3 As a result, CCP 
leaders neither respected the traditional court system nor considered 
the rule of law necessary to create a just, fair, and stable society.4 
Moreover, the traditional communist ideology, to which they 
adhered, rejected notions of an impartial and fair judiciary.5 
Instead, communist ideologues viewed the judicial system as an 
institution of the bourgeois used primarily to oppress and exploit 
workers and peasants.6 Accordingly, when the CCP gained control 
of China, traditional ideas about law quickly became subordinate to 
the CCP’s communist philosophy.7  
 
 
1 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 42–44, 163 (2003). 
2 Id.  
3 JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION AND 
TRADITION 163 (2d ed. 1996). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
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Chinese legal systems further deteriorated under Mao Zedong8 
as his regime attempted to violently change China’s settled 
routine.9 The CCP believed that existing legal institutions were 
remnants of the “old society” of “bourgeois-capitalists.”10 As a 
result, China’s formal laws and structures were all essentially 
destroyed over the course of nearly twenty years.11 This legal 
purging occurred because CCP leaders believed that only by 
ridding itself of these organs would China become as “red” as they 
desired.12  
A few years later, the role of the judiciary experienced another 
change, this time on a basic, constitutional level. Although China’s 
constitution characterized the judiciary as an independent body, 
different agencies frequently usurped the functions and powers of 
the judiciary at various times throughout Chinese history. 
Following the communist revolution, a wide-ranging group of 
organizations, such as revolutionary committees, military control 
groups, CCP committees, and public security organs, repeatedly 
assumed judicial roles and undermined the judiciary’s 
constitutional independence.13 Finally, in 1975 the National 
People’s Congress adopted a new constitution and officially 
abolished the independence of the judiciary by placing it under the 
control of CCP rather than state leadership.14 
 
 
8 Regarding names, this note adopts China’s official system for romanizing 
Chinese—the pinyin style. Exceptions apply for names of individuals from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, or Singapore, which, for various reasons, use different systems of 
romanization. Additionally, all Chinese names in this note generally follow the 
Chinese convention of surname first, followed by the given name. Thus, for example, 
President Hu Jintao is properly referred to as President Hu or Mr. Hu, not President 
Jintao or Mr. Jintao. In cases where the individual primarily uses an English name, 
however, English naming conventions are used, e.g. Jackson Guo is properly referred 
to as Mr. Guo. Finally, in some situations, context leaves it unclear as to which is the 
individual’s surname. For improper name usages within this note, the author 
apologizes.  
9 DREYER, supra note 3, at 164. 
10 Id. at 168.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. (explaining that some went as far as advocating the destruction of the entire 
legal and constitutional structure in order to purge the CCP of bourgeois leaders). 
13 DREYER, supra note 3, at 168–69. 
14 See id. at 169. The Chinese communist system, much like that of the former 
Soviet Union, divides the CCP and the State or government into separate but parallel 
systems. Id. at 87–89. For example, the highest legislative body in the CCP is the 
National Party Congress, with various CCP committees functioning at the local level. 
Id. at 90. It is mirrored by the government’s highest legislative body, the National 
People’s Congress, with people’s congresses also functioning at the local level. Id. at 
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In 1978 when Deng Xiaoping ascended to power, China 
experienced another shift in its legal system. Unlike previous shifts, 
Deng Xiaoping’s influence moved China closer to a formalized 
legal system. Prior to 1978, China had molded into a “societal 
legal” system15 focused upon widely accepted norms and values of 
Chinese society.16 Deng Xiaoping changed the societal legal system 
into a more predictable jural system, emphasizing formal, codified 
rules enforced by a regular judicial body.17  
Like its judicial system, China’s constitution also evolved, 
placing increasing value upon independence and equality.18 In 1978 
the constitution was changed to affirm the principles of judicial 
independence and guaranteed equality before the law for every 
social class.19 In 1982 China adopted yet another constitution, 
which further strengthened the people’s courts’ independence.20 
The 1982 constitution also characterized China as a “people’s 
democratic dictatorship” rather than a “dictatorship of the 
proletariat.”21 These and many other changes made by the 1982 
constitution have since taken root, and China’s legal system today 
is largely a conglomeration of the principles embodied in the 1978 
and 1982 constitutions.22  
Despite the many constitutional improvements of the 1970s and 
1980s, many challenges remain. For example, one critical and 
defining feature of the current government system is its lack of a 
separation of powers.23 China’s political-legal system (zhengfa 
xitong) consists of lawmaking, regulatory, and administrative 
                                                                                                                   
87–90. Generally, the National Party Congress will convene and enact policies 
previously formulated by the politburo Standing Committee, and then the National 
People’s Congress will convene and endorse the decisions of the CCP’s congress. Id. 
at 90. 
15 Id. at 167–69. The initial development of the “societal” versus “jural” 
dichotomy in describing the development of Chinese law is attributed to Shaochuan 
Leng and Hungdah Chiu. Id. at 185 n.1 (citing SHAOCHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS (1985)).  
16 DREYER, supra note 3, at 164.  
17 Id. at 169. 
18 Id. at 170. 
19 Id.  
20 See id. at 171. The independence, however, is limited because the CCP may 
still interfere with the people’s courts. Id. In addition, the courts at each level are 
dependent on the people’s congresses or other bureaucratic agencies for funding, 
staffing, and appointments. CHOW, supra note 1, at 195–97. 
21 DREYER, supra note 3, at 171. 
22 See id. at 169–72. 
23 CHOW, supra note 1, at 142–43. 
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entities, as well as courts and police.24 All of these entities possess 
overlapping legislative, administrative, and judicial authority.25 The 
system’s highest level consists of the National People’s Congress, 
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and the State 
Council. Together, these bodies have supreme legislative authority. 
However, the myriad of ministries, administrations, bureaus, 
agencies, and departments below this level often possess authority 
to legislate within their own jurisdictions.26 As a result, consistent 
legal standards have been difficult to achieve.27 
While China has made progress in developing its legal system, 
it can still make many improvements that would allow the rule of 
law to exert a more significant guiding influence.28 These 
improvements include insulation of the judiciary from political 
controls,29 reduction of corruption,30 and the establishment and 
enforcement of laws in basic areas.31 
 
B. The Creation of China’s “Socialist Market Economy” 
 
In the pre-Deng era, the central government managed almost 
every aspect of China’s economy, which often led to an 
unproductive workforce and a stagnant economy.32 In accordance 
with the Soviet model, China’s system ensured that government 
ministries controlled and managed every major industry.33 The 
creation of such ministries eliminated the need to establish 
regulatory measures because the state already controlled each major 
 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Of Laws and Men, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2001, at 15.  
29 See id. 
30 See Landlords of the World Unite!, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2002, at 69. 
31 See Beyond a Bail-Out, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 2004, at 13. 
32 See generally DREYER, supra note 3, at 138–47; MARK BORTHWICK, PACIFIC 
CENTURY: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PACIFIC ASIA 405–10 (2d ed. 1998). 
33 BORTHWICK, supra note 32, at 406. Interestingly, the CCP did not immediately 
expropriate all private enterprises upon proclaiming the People’s Republic. DREYER, 
supra note 3, at 143–44. Initially, the CCP targeted enterprises that either the 
Nationalist regime or individuals in the Nationalist Party ran. Id. at 143. The CCP then 
initiated a policy that consolidated remaining private firms into joint state-private 
ventures according to industry with the state-appointed management taking the 
dominant role. Id. at 144. Finally, in 1955, the CCP began buying out the remaining 
capitalist shares in enterprises, thus creating a system of state-owned enterprises. 
BORTHWICK, supra note 32, at 406.  
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industry. Under Mao Zedong’s egalitarian policies, urban workers, 
who tended to neglect the quality and marketability of the items 
they produced, received an “iron rice bowl,”34 thereby leaving state 
enterprises generally overstaffed and underproductive.35  
Upon his emergence in 1978, Deng Xiaoping instigated 
tremendous economic reforms that put China on the path of 
modernization. He began by reestablishing proper incentives in 
agriculture.36 Next, he opened China’s light industry to foreign 
investment and created special economic zones in the southern 
coastal provinces.37 Perhaps Deng’s most important reform was 
allowing state enterprises to retain profits (subject to taxation) 
rather than continuing to require that they forfeit all their profits to 
the central government.38 Deng also initiated a bankruptcy law to 
remove failing businesses from the economy.39 As a result of the 
changes implemented by the Deng regime, China’s economy has 
experienced a remarkable expansion, averaging approximately nine 
percent annual growth during the last twenty years.40   
Despite these reform efforts, many state enterprises continued 
to lose money and drain the economy.41 China’s bankruptcy law, 
for example, continues to be largely ineffectual because the 
government is reluctant to apply the law to state enterprises for fear 
of the political consequences that could result from the economic 
 
 
34 The “iron rice bowl,” or tie fan wan, refers to the Communist practice of 
providing workers and their families with their essential needs, such as employment in 
state enterprises, housing, schooling, and health care, for the rest of their lives. 
WILLIAM VAN KEMENADE, CHINA, HONG KONG, TAIWAN, INC. 26, 28 (Diane Webb 
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1997) (1996); DREYER, supra note 3, at 150. The idea is that 
the workers and their families do not have to worry because an iron rice bowl will 
never break.  
35 DREYER, supra note 3, at 146–47. 
36 Philip Bowring, The Next Phase, 2 CAP. TRENDS No. 4, at 3–4 (1997). For 
example, Deng allowed farmers who produced more than the set quota to sell the 
excess on the free market. DREYER, supra note 3, at 148.  
37 Bowring, supra note 36, at 3–4.  
38 DREYER, supra note 3, at 151. These reforms resulted in an increase in the 
quantity, quality, and variety of goods produced, as factories worked hard to meet 
consumer demand. Id. Additionally, workers worked harder and were rewarded with 
increased spending power. Id. at 152. 
39 Id. at 151. 
40 Shi Ting, FDI Shows 15pc Growth Despite Measures to Stop Overheating, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Aug. 20, 2004, at 6. 
41 See James McGregor, Closing of China’s Bright Moon Plant Stands Out as a 
Sunny Day in the Annals of Beijing Reform, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Mar. 25, 1991, 
at 5. In 1991, Chinese economists reported that almost two-thirds of China’s 102,000 
state-owned enterprises were losing money. Id.  
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displacement often associated with bankruptcies.42 Consequently, 
despite their failure to produce profits, technically insolvent state 
enterprises continue to receive credit from state-controlled 
financiers.43 Beijing’s overall reluctance to act against state 
enterprises reflects the fear that disassembling China’s iron rice 
bowls would create a reactionary movement, which could threaten 
national unity and ultimately undermine the CCP’s dominance.44 In 
addition, close ties between the management of state enterprises 
and the CCP, combined with a stifling government bureaucracy, 
make it harder for the State to instigate the needed reforms.45  
Despite the obvious economic problems associated with state-
owned enterprises, they are only a small part of an even larger 
economic problem in China—administrative monopolies.46 
Generally, the term “administrative monopolies” refers to state-
owned or state-run holding companies that gain market power 
through legitimate legislative or administrative means.47 A common 
form of administrative monopoly occurs in China when state-
owned enterprises have direct affiliation with a regulatory ministry 
that receives preferential treatment.48 Another particularly 
damaging form of administrative monopoly occurs when 
administrative regions or localities enact local protectionist 
measures by creating barriers for the entrance of goods, services, 
and raw materials into their regions.49 These administrative 
 
 
42 James Kynge, Beijing Urged to Adopt Bankruptcy Law, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Mar. 22, 2001, at 11. In fact, while insolvent state enterprises survive on continued 
financing, the bankruptcy law does not offer similar protection to foreign-owned 
firms. Beyond a Bail-Out, supra note 31, at 13. 
43 Kynge, supra note 42, at 11. 
44 Bowring, supra note 36, at 6–7. 
45 Id. 
46 See Daniel S. Mason & Athena Hou Jiangxiao, China’s Proposed Anti-
Monopoly Law: The US and European Perspectives, ASIA L., Nov. 2004, at 11, 
available at http://www.zelle.com/sub/C_monop.pdf. 
47 Jijian Yang, Market Power in China: Manifestations, Effects and Legislation, 
21 REV. INDUS. ORG. 167, 171–72 (2002). 
48 Id. 
49 Id.; see also Shi nian yi jian xian ming feng mang fan long duan fa zheng shi 
bu ru li fa cheng xu 十年一剑显明锋芒反垄断法正式步入立法程序, ZHONGGUO 
GONG YE BAO 中国工业报 [CHINA INDUSTRIAL REPORT], June 13, 2005 [hereinafter 
Shi nian]. These protectionist measures are widespread and can result in inter-
provincial trade wars. For example, Mr. Yang cites a trade war between the Hubei 
Province and the Shanghai Municipality. Hubei imposed an RMB 70,000 (US$8,464) 
duty on residents purchasing Shanghai-produced cars. Shanghai responded by 
imposing an RMB 80,000 (US$9,674) licensing fee for all Hubei-produced cars. Jijian 
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monopolies often damage the economy through welfare-reducing 
practices such as boycotting, discriminatory pricing, compulsory 
purchasing, and price collusion.50 
 
C. The Development of Antitrust Regulations in China 
 
The liberalization movement of the 1980s and 1990s created the 
need for governmental economic regulation if China was to 
maintain the stability of its self-proclaimed “socialist market 
economy.”51 Consequently, in addition to bankruptcy law, China 
began developing laws to regulate real estate, securities, and 
mergers and acquisitions.52 By the mid-nineties, the rise of 
consumerism and the influx of activity and investment from large 
foreign corporations hastened the call for antitrust laws to keep the 
market functioning smoothly.53   
Chinese legal scholars offer several justifications for antitrust 
law in China. One approach argues that antitrust law is necessary to 
prevent economic monopolization of the market and to provide a 
governmental check over multinational corporations.54 A second 
approach asserts that antitrust law is necessary to maintain 
consumer welfare.55 Notably, to achieve this objective, anti-
monopoly regulations must be applied across the board to all state-
created monopolies, multinational corporations, and domestic 
firms.56 A third approach suggests that antitrust law is necessary to 
prevent abuse of power by government administrative 
                                                                                                                   
Yang, supra note 47, at 172 (citing Monopoly: The Government Seems to be the 
Culprit, BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, Dec. 22, 2002). 
50 Jijian Yang, supra note 47, at 172–73. 
51 See DREYER, supra note 3, at 155–57. 
52 See, e.g., Xiannian Ye, China Real Estate Market - Laws and Regulations 
Concerning Land and Real Estate, CHINA WINDOW, Aug. 1, 2004, http://www.china-
window.com/china_market/china_real_estate/china-real-estate-market--7.shtml; 
ZHIWU CHEN, CAPITAL MARKETS AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE CHINA CASE 6–9 
(2003), http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/zc25/chinastudytrip/capitalmarketsandlegal 
development.pdf. 
53 See Rebecca Buckman, China Hurries Antitrust Law; Multinationals Worry 
They Will Become Measure’s First Targets, WALL ST. J. (E. ed.), June 11, 2004, at A7. 
54 Wang Xiaoye, Report: Anti-Monopoly Law Vital, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 20, 
2004, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/22/content_ 
367692.htm.  
55 Zhu Qiwen, Anti-Monopoly Law Crucial for Consumers, CHINA DAILY, July 
12, 2004, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200407/12/content_ 
347593.htm. 
56 Id. 
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monopolies.57 This approach is based on the assertion that, in terms 
of distortion of transaction behavior and preclusion of market 
competition, administrative monopolies are more damaging to 
China’s economy than economic monopolies.58 
Despite such justifications, the development of Chinese 
antitrust laws has thus far been a piecemeal effort.59 For example, 
in 1993 China adopted the Law for Countering Unfair Competition 
as its first attempt at antitrust-like regulation.60 This law is akin to a 
simple consumer protection law with provisions against price fixing 
or bid rigging, bribery, deceptive advertising, and coercive sales.61   
In 2003 China adopted a set of new merger and acquisition laws 
entitled the Interim Provision for Foreign Investors to Merge 
 
 
57 Jijian Yang, supra note 47, at 175.  
58 Id. Some of the damaging effects referred to include: (1) harm to consumers 
(most of the complaints made to the Chinese Consumers’ Association were related to 
services of monopolized sectors, particularly postal services and utilities); (2) 
increased prices (state monopolies are less efficient and therefore charge higher 
prices); (3) inadequate investment (highly profitable sectors are monopolized by the 
state, denying firms access to potentially profitable investment opportunities); and (4) 
increased corruption (corrupt officials are able to earn excessive profits from 
monopoly earnings). Id. at 175–76. 
59 See generally Peter Neumann and Jackson Guo, The Slow Boat to Antitrust 
Law in China: An Examination of New Regulations on Monopoly Pricing, CHINA LAW 
& PRAC., Sept. 1, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.faegre.com/ 
articles/article_1220.aspx (outlining the step-by-step developments in China antitrust 
law from 1980 to 2003). 
60 Law for Countering Unfair Competition (1993) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://apecweb.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/Competition/cncom2.html [hereinafter 1993 
Unfair Competition Law]. The 1993 Unfair Competition Law had little practical 
impact on firms’ practices because it failed to create a systematic and comprehensive 
anti-monopoly framework and it lacked a regulatory or enforcement agency. Jijian 
Yang, supra note 47, at 179. 
61 See 1993 Unfair Competition Law, supra note 60. Article 1 of the 1993 Unfair 
Competition Law declares that the law is enacted “[w]ith a view to safeguarding the 
healthy development of the socialist market economy, encouraging and protecting fair 
competition, stopping acts of unfair competition, and defending the lawful rights and 
interests of operators and consumers.” Id. (emphasis added). Specific provisions of 
the law include article 5, which prevents the unauthorized use of trademarks, 
enterprise names, and names or packaging of well-known goods. Article 7 prevents 
local government agencies from using administrative power either to force others to 
buy goods or to prevent entry of outside goods. Article 8 outlaws the use of bribery as 
a means to buy or sell goods. Article 9 prohibits engagement in false advertising. 
Article 11 prevents the below-cost sale of goods for the purpose of excluding 
competitors. Chapter 4 (comprising articles 20 through 32) stipulates the penalties, 
including damages and fines, for engaging in a prohibited action. Id. 
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Domestic Enterprises.62 Under these rules, which are directed 
specifically at foreign firms, a foreign investor must seek approval 
from the relevant government bureau prior to conducting a merger 
when (1) one party’s annual sales in China are above RMB 1.5 
billion (about US$180 million), (2) the foreign firm has acquired 
more than ten Chinese firms in the same industry in a single year, 
(3) either party has a domestic market share greater than twenty 
percent, or (4) the post-merger domestic share is over twenty-five 
percent.63 The rules also specify under what conditions foreign 
investors must report offshore mergers to the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) and the State Administration of Industry 
and Commerce (SAIC).64 In addition, the rules provide exemptions 
 
 
62 Interim Provision for Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic Enterprises 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade & Econ. Cooperation/ State Admin. of 
Indus. & Commerce/ State Bureau of Taxation/ State Admin. of Foreign Exch., Mar. 
7, 2003, effective Apr. 12 2003) CHINALAWINFO (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) (P.R.C.) 
(subscription limited source on file with author) [hereinafter 2003 M&A Rules]. As 
indicated by their title, the purpose of these rules is to fill a regulatory void until the 
government enacts a more comprehensive antitrust law. Thomas E. Jones & Adam J. 
Kearney, New Chinese Merger Control Rules with Worldwide Transactional 
Implications: The Third Major Antitrust Jurisdiction?, in PLC GLOBAL COUNSEL 
COMPETITION LAW HANDBOOK 2003/04 103, 103 (7th ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.practicallaw.com/jsp/article.jsp?item=32501. Jones and Kearney, of 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, indicate that the delay in the adoption of the 
submitted draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law, combined with the adoption of Provisional 
Rules for Mergers and Acquisitions and Provisional Rules for Prevention of 
Monopoly Pricing, has led to speculation that the drafting process has been delayed by 
vested interests. Id. These interests may include the “recently corporatized state 
enterprises… projected by policy makers to become the first Chinese multinationals.” 
Id.  
63 2003 M&A Rules, supra note 62, art. 19. 
64 Id. art. 21. The offshore transaction triggers are: (1) a party owns assets within 
China which exceed RMB 3 billion (about US$263 million), (2) the sales turnover of 
the foreign firm that merges with the domestic party exceeds RMB 1.5 billion in that 
year, (3) either party has a domestic market share of over twenty percent, (4) the post-
merger domestic share is over twenty-five percent, or (5) a party will either directly or 
indirectly hold equity in more than fifteen Chinese firms in the relevant industry as a 
result of the merger. Id. 
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from antitrust investigations65 but do not provide sanctions and 
remedies.66 
In late 2003, China also adopted the Interim Provisions on 
Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly.67 These rules prevent 
entities from achieving market dominance as inferred by a firm’s 
“market share in the relevant market, substitutability of relevant 
goods, and ease of new entry.”68 Additionally, the rules prevent 
price coordination and supply restriction, and prohibit government 
agencies from illegally intervening in price determinations.69 
However, like the 2003 rules regarding mergers and acquisitions, 
the 2003 monopoly pricing rules fail to create civil causes of action 
for violations.70 
 
 
65 Id.; see Jones & Kearney, supra note 62, at 108. Transactions offering any of 
the following benefits are exempt from antitrust investigation: (1) improvement of fair 
competition of the market, (2) restructuring of a loss-making enterprise with 
guaranteed employment, (3) introduction of advanced technology and management 
talent, or (4) environmental improvement. 2003 M&A Rules, supra note 62, art. 22. 
66 See 2003 M&A Rules, supra note 62; Jones & Kearney, supra note 62, at 108. 
Despite China’s attempts to enact antitrust measures through the 1993 Unfair 
Competition Law and the 2003 M&A Rules, Neumann and Guo note that the 
following factors limit the regulatory effectiveness of the measures: (1) the dominant 
interpretation and enforcement role of administrative agencies “in an economy with 
significant state ownership” raises conflict-of-interest concerns; (2) the failure of the 
regulations to create private causes of action for injuries resulting from anti-
competitive behavior forces individuals to go through the relevant administrative 
agency to get relief; (3) “Chinese courts have very limited authority to decide 
competition- and antitrust-related disputes;” and (4) the Chinese courts’ limited role 
will cause them to continue to lack the expertise and experience necessary to be 
effective in complex economic and business litigation. Neumann & Guo, supra note 
59. 
67 Interim Provisions on Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly (promulgated by 
the State Dev. Planning Comm’n, June 18, 2003, effective Nov. 1 2003) 
CHINALAWINFO (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2003 Monopoly 
Pricing Rules]. Robert Lewis, managing partner of Lovells’ Beijing office, believes 
that the adoption of the predatory pricing rules indicates that the drafted anti-
monopoly rules are politically sensitive. Bei Hu, China Unveils Competition Rules; 
Observers Fear Political Resistance May Delay Implementation of the Country’s First 
Antitrust Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), July 2, 2003, at 1. Hans Au, also an 
attorney at Lovells Beijing, recognizes that the adoption of temporary monopoly 
pricing rules demonstrates a “turf war” among different CCP departments and 
localities. Id.; see also Yong Zhao, Will Protectionists Hijack China’s Competition 
Law?, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (London), Jan. 1, 2004, at 21. 
68 2003 Monopoly Pricing Rules, supra note 67. 
69 Id. 
70 See id.; Neumann & Guo, supra note 59. Neumann and Guo argue that the 
2003 Monopoly Pricing Rules fail to address the basic problems under the previous 
monopoly provisions. Id. To be effective, said pricing rules must be implemented and 
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D. Drafting of the Anti-Monopoly Law 
 
In 1987 China’s State Council Legislative Department 
established a drafting team to develop anti-monopoly law.71 
Nevertheless, drafting on the law did not actually begin until the 
early 1990s.72 During the drafting process, the drafting committee 
distributed unofficial drafts on a limited basis to groups and 
individuals for comment and recommendation.73 These drafts gave 
business and legal professionals a glimpse of the anti-monopoly 
provisions under consideration.  
The 2002 Draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law (2002 Draft) 
organizes China’s anti-monopoly law into chapters. Chapter 4 
regulates market concentration and prevents mergers that eliminate 
or limit competition, hinder development of the national economy, 
or damage the public interest.74 Chapter 5 addresses administrative 
monopolies by preventing certain governmental practices, including 
forced purchases and abusive regional measures that hinder the 
flow of goods and services.75 Chapter 5 also prohibits the formation 
of industry monopolies that interfere with competition or bar entry 
into particular markets.76 Chapter 6 calls for an independent 
                                                                                                                   
enforced by Chinese regulators and courts, which is a difficult task considering that 
the rules do not significantly expand the procedural rights of aggrieved market actors. 
Id. 
71 Jijian Yang, supra note 47, at 180. 
72 Shi Ting, Breaking Down the Barriers to Progress; Taskforce Sent to 28 
Jurisdictions to Inspect Efforts Against Protectionism, S. CHINA MORNING POST 
(H.K.), Nov. 10, 2004, at 7 [hereinafter Breaking Down the Barriers]; Shi Ting, 
Watchdog Excluded in Law to Stop Trade Abuses; Anti-Monopoly Legislation 
Weakened by Lack of Such an Agency, Expert Warns, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), 
Nov. 8, 2004, at 7 [hereinafter Watchdog Excluded]. Initially, the primary 
responsibility for introduction of the law rested with the State Economic and Trade 
Commission and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), but that 
role now rests with the recently instituted Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Yong 
Zhao, supra note 67. 
73 Yong Zhao, supra note 67. See, for example, YEE WAH CHIN ET AL., AM. BAR 
ASS’N, JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S SECTIONS OF 
ANTITRUST LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-
MONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2003), 
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/divisions/regulation/chin715II.pdf, for the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA’s) Antitrust and International Law and Practice Sections’ 
recommendations regarding the available draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law. 
74 Fan long duan fa (zheng qiu yi jian gao) 反垄断法（征求意见稿） [Anti-
Monopoly Law (Draft for Seeking Recommendations)] ch. 4 (2002) (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter 2002 Draft]. 
75 Id. ch. 5; see Mason & Hou, supra note 46; Shi nian, supra note 49. 
76 2002 Draft, supra note 74, ch. 5. 
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administrative organ to oversee the implementation and 
enforcement of anti-monopoly laws.77 
In addition, the 2002 Draft defines a “dominant market 
position” as one firm having over half of the market, two firms 
having over two-thirds of the market, or three firms having over 
three-fourths of the market.78 This provision has caused many 
multinational corporations in China to worry that their business 
affairs may become subject to heavy regulation.79 
After nearly ten years of drafting, the committee took the first 
step towards enacting legislation. On October 27, 2004, it 
submitted its version of the anti-monopoly laws (Submitted Draft) 
to the State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office.80 According to 
 
 
77 Id. ch. 6.  
78 2002 Draft, supra note 74, ch. 3, art. 16. Conversely, the ABA defines 
“monopoly” and “dominant market position” in terms of status—whether a firm has 
the ability to set its prices in strategic reaction to other firms’ pricing decisions—and 
then specify what conduct would be against the law. YEE WAH CHIN ET AL., supra note 
73, at 11.  
79 Andrew K. Collier, Antitrust Raises Abuse Fears; Mainland Companies Could 
Exploit New Monopoly Rules to Make It Harder for Foreigners to Compete in the 
Market, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Jan. 13, 2004, at 1. Companies with 
particular fears include Eastman Kodak, who recently purchased ownership interests 
in Lucky Film, China’s largest film manufacturer; Proctor & Gamble, whose Pantene, 
Head & Shoulders, and Rejoice shampoos are the top three brands in China; and 
L’Oreal, whose acquisition of the Chinese skincare company Mininurse catapulted 
L’Oreal to second in terms of market share. Id. In addition, a recent report by the 
SAIC specifically singled out Microsoft and Tetra Pak (a Swedish manufacturer of 
packaging for beverages) as a threat to domestic firms in China. Buckman, supra note 
53, at A7; see also Mure Dickie, Pressure for Anti-Monopoly Law Grows: Beijing is 
Urged to Act Faster on Introducing Legislation to Prevent Competition Being Stifled 
by Market Domina, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.) (London), May 26, 2004, at 12. 
80 Zhang Yi 张毅, Wo guo fan long duan fa song shen gao yi xing cheng 
我国《反垄断法》送审稿已形成 [China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Submission Draft 
Already Formed], XINHUA FA ZHI SHI XIAN 新华法治视线 [XINHUA LEGAL WIRE] 
(Beijing), Oct. 27, 2004, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-
10/27/content_2146394.htm [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law Submission]; Watchdog 
Excluded, supra note 72. The draft law will probably come under discussion at the 
national legislators’ meeting in March of 2006 and during the 10th National People’s 
Congress, which ends its session in 2008. Breaking Down the Barriers, supra note 72; 
see Watchdog Excluded, supra note 72. Reports speculate that the main reason for the 
delay in drafting is major infighting among the responsible agencies as to who should 
actually oversee the implementation of the new law. Alysha Webb, Antimonopoly 
Flap in China Doesn't Worry Tire Makers, TIRE BUS., Jan. 3, 2005, at 1; Buckman, 
supra note 53; Yong Zhao, supra note 67; Bei Hu, supra note 67. While MOFCOM 
has taken over drafting responsibilities, the SAIC, which oversees the 1993 Unfair 
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official reports, the Submitted Draft does not provide for an 
independent agency to oversee implementation or to report 
violations of anti-monopoly law.81 The Submitted Draft, according 
to some reports, also fails to include definitions for important terms 
such as “dominant market share.”82 Notwithstanding these 
deficiencies, the architects of the Submitted Draft devoted a whole 
chapter to regulating administrative monopolies. This chapter 
includes provisions designed to prevent government departments 
from coercing people into buying and selling products, as well as 
provisions to counter local protectionist measures like restrictive 
regional trade zones.83 As Chinese companies begin to develop 
increasingly significant market share in certain industries, Beijing 
has gradually shifted its primary focus away from the prevention of 
foreign dominance in the Chinese marketplace to other areas of 
economic concern. 84 This change of emphasis may explain the 
differences between the previous drafts and the Submitted Draft. 
Despite the appearance of progress and unity in moving the 
proposed antitrust laws forward, Chinese bureaucracy has once 
again proven to be inhospitable to the initial development of much 
needed antitrust laws. At the end of 2004, many expected the 
National People’s Congress to pass the anti-monopoly laws in 
2005.85 However, in early 2005 MOFCOM, the SAIC, and the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) each 
released independent and conflicting suggestions relating to the 
                                                                                                                   
Competition Law, also has power in some areas relating to antitrust law. Watchdog 
Excluded, supra note 72. 
81 Anti-Monopoly Law Submission, supra note 80. There is a noted concern that 
the absence of an independent agency will make the laws less effective against both 
administrative and economic monopolies possessing strong lobbying power. Id.; see 
infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
82 Webb, supra note 80. Xiong Weihua, chief secretary of the China Rubber 
Industry, believes that the way the anti-monopoly laws define monopolization will be 
key to the laws’ effectiveness as an industry regulator. Id. According to Shanghai 
attorney Victor Gu, a senior associate at the law firm Boss & Young, agreement on a 
definition for terms such as “market” and “dominant market position” is being 
frustrated by infighting between MOFCOM, the SAIC, and the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) over which bureau has primary jurisdiction of the 
new law. Id.; see infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.  
83 Watchdog Excluded, supra note 72. 
84 Webb, supra note 80. As Boss & Young attorney Victor Gu states, “Beijing is 
looking into the possibility that some domestic companies may have monopoly power 
in the future.” Id. 
85 See Cory Huang, NPC Set to Pass Anti-Monopoly Law; A Raft of Legislation 
Covering Commercial Activities Is Likely to Be Enacted Next Year, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (H.K.), Dec. 31, 2004, at 13. 
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structural framework of the legislation.86 MOFCOM promptly 
responded by denying reports that differences regarding the anti-
monopoly legislation existed among the ministries.87 Thus, China 
must iron out some serious administrative wrinkles in its legislative 
system before enacting its anti-monopoly laws in a manner flexible 
enough to remain responsive to its rapidly growing markets.  
 
III. CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, THOUGH EFFECTIVE AS A 
PROTECTIONIST MEASURE, WILL NOT LIKELY MAKE CHINA THE 
WORLD’S NEXT MAJOR ANTITRUST JURISDICTION 
 
A. An Anti-Monopoly Law as a Basis for Economic Nationalism 
and Control of Non-State Enterprises 
 
Economic development in China is characterized by the trade-
off between improving the economic system through 
implementation of liberalizing measures and retaining the 
centralized communist political system.88 Any increase in economic 
freedom through market liberalization, such as lowering local 
participation requirements in joint ventures or reducing government 
ownership in state industries, represents a loss of control by the 
central government.89 However, increasing globalization 
encourages the implementation of liberalizing measures such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) entry agreement. Over the next 
ten years, China must honor its obligations to the WTO, which 
include continued tariff reductions and increased intellectual 
 
 
86 Zhang Liming 张黎明, Zhong yang san bu wei zheng li fan long duan fa jin 
nian chu tai wu wang 中央三部委争立《反垄断法》今年出台无望 [Three Central 
Government Ministries Conflict, Anti-Monopoly Law Has No Hope of Being 
Introduced This Year], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Bejing), Jan. 11, 2005, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-01/11/content_2442715.htm; see David Fang, 
Bureaucrats Stall Anti-Monopoly Law; Three Ministries’ Efforts to Support the 
Legislative Process Have Hindered Progress, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Jan. 
12, 2005, at 8; Webb, supra note 80, at 1. 
87 Zhang Liming, supra note 86. Peking University law professor Sheng Jiemin 
believes that the bureaucratic infighting could lead to bureaucratic duplication and 
overlap with no single organization filling the role of an independent anti-monopoly 
watchdog agency. Id. Without such independent agency, Professor Sheng believes it is 
unlikely that the legislation will pass this year. Id. 
88 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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property protections.90 Thus, centralized government’s hold upon 
the economy will continually loosen. Viewed in such a light, the 
proposed Anti-Monopoly Law appears less as a means of 
promoting competition than as a tool for protecting narrow, 
bureaucratic interests. 
Early justifications for enacting anti-monopoly laws focused on 
preventing multinational corporations from monopolizing the newly 
liberalized Chinese markets.91 These justifications were not driven 
by worries of multinational corporations acquiring enough market 
power to cause harm to consumers or to cause inefficiencies in 
market production and resource allocation; rather, Beijing’s policy 
makers feared that sophisticated foreign corporations would simply 
push un-savvy local competitors out of business.92   
Protecting the presence of many local producers in a 
competitive market is beneficial to the CCP in two crucial ways. 
First, it allows local producers to participate in an evolving and 
innovative market, thereby increasing the possibility of capturing 
technological expansions domestically. Allowing Chinese firms to 
take advantage of protectionist measures that facilitate their growth 
into large worldwide firms would also further the CCP’s interest. 
The CCP could then gain prestige for having Chinese companies as 
world players. Second, the CCP would benefit from dramatic 
increases in corporate tax revenue and enhanced stability in 
Chinese labor markets via a strong presence of Chinese, rather than 
foreign, corporate entities.  
Although larger Chinese corporations might present the CCP 
with control problems, skillful application of the Anti-Monopoly 
Law can solve these challenges. Through selective application of 
the Anti-Monopoly Law, the Chinese government could break up 
domestic corporations that reach such levels of power that they 
could begin to threaten state interests. 
Likewise, the CCP must consider the possibility of a 
multinational corporation acquiring enough power to rival or 
threaten the CCP’s stability.93 By providing the government with a 
mechanism for limiting the size of multinational firms, the CCP can 
 
 
90 See generally Intellectual Property Theft in China and Russia: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees 
/judiciary/hju21217.000/hju21217_0.htm. 
91 See supra notes 54–55, 57 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
93 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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maintain its control over the market as well as ensure its role as the 
preeminent societal and political power in China.94   
 
B. Strategic Amputation: Applying Anti-Monopoly Laws Against 
State-Owned Enterprises 
 
Several important considerations affect the anti-monopoly 
regulation of state-owned enterprises and administrative 
monopolies. As a transitional communist economy, the state sector 
in China is an important player in both the economic market and 
the everyday life of individual citizens.95 Nevertheless, reforming 
the state enterprise system is probably the most pressing issue 
facing the Chinese economy in the twenty-first century, and the 
new anti-monopoly laws represent a tool to accomplish such 
reform.96 Unfortunately, China’s track record on reforms is less 
than encouraging. Inconsistent application of bankruptcy laws to 
reform state enterprises illustrates Beijing’s reluctance to enforce 
laws that bear against what are virtually its own organs.97 
The major question is whether the government will apply the 
anti-monopoly laws to state-owned enterprises, which are primary 
characteristics of a communist economic system. Because China 
has no separation of powers among the various government 
departments, individual departmental interests are difficult to 
ascertain.98 Moreover, the historical interplay between a centralized 
government system, state-owned enterprises, and Chinese society 
suggests that the varied interests regarding such enterprises may not 
favorably unify.99  
An analogy that is particularly illustrative of the conflicts 
involved is that of self-amputation. Self-amputation is a difficult 
proposition to face and occurs only when the interest in preserving 
the appendage is severely outweighed by the probability that 
removing the appendage would be necessary for the survival of the 
individual. Similarly, with respect to any single state enterprise, it 
is difficult to argue that reform of that enterprise is necessary to the 
survival of any single bureau or the bureaucracy as a whole. 
 
 
94 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
95 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra notes 38, 40–42 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra note 23.  
99 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, to the extent that state-operated enterprises provide 
stable employment to a large number of workers, any reforms that 
have significant detrimental effects on employment may serve to 
undermine the government’s control.100 
On the other hand, reform is likely in cases where one agency 
has particularly strong interests in conducting reform while the 
other agencies harbor only minute interests in preserving state-
owned enterprises. Under such conditions, the agency with strong 
interests could act unilaterally to instigate reform where no other 
agency would likely have an incentive to intervene. This fact holds 
particularly true in instances where high transaction costs prevent 
effective coordination. Notably, the aforementioned conditions do 
not presently exist in China’s bureaucracy. Instead, the current 
Chinese bureaucracy can be characterized as existing at two levels. 
The higher level consists of an elite group with vast authority (the 
Politburo and National People’s Congress). Below it, the lower 
level of Chinese bureaucracy consists of many bureaus and 
departments, each possessing equal powers vis-à-vis the others.101 
This arrangement allows elite authorities to maintain power via the 
time-honored divide and conquer strategy of pitting potential 
challengers against one another. 
Therefore, while the Chinese government is likely to use anti-
monopoly law to regulate foreign firms and possibly even domestic 
firms as a means of maintaining its supremacy, it remains to be 
seen whether Beijing will be willing to use anti-monopoly law to 
cut off its own appendages for the sake of preserving and 
developing the body.102   
 
C. Effectiveness of the Anti-Monopoly Law in Achieving the  
Stated Goals 
 
Given China’s historical suspicion of foreigners and foreign 
entities in general, Beijing’s willingness to use an anti-monopoly 
law against super-corporations, such as Microsoft and Kodak, is 
largely unquestioned.103 The more important question is whether 
such a law will be an effective tool by which the government can 
prevent foreign dominance. Beijing’s effective application of the 
 
 
100 See Jijian Yang, supra note 47. 
101 See CHOW, supra note 1, at 142–43. 
102 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
103 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  
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Anti-Monopoly Law against firms hinges on two critical factors: 
(1) the way the drafters choose to define key terms like 
“monopoly,” “monopolize,” “dominant position,” and “market 
share,”104 and (2) the ability of the relevant bureaucracies—
MOFCOM, the SAIC, and the NDRC—to harmonize their interests 
enough to administer and enforce the law in a consistent and 
singular manner.105 
 
1. Properly defining key terms enables effective enforcement 
 
Early drafts of the anti-monopoly laws incorporate bright-line 
rules for determining whether to classify a firm as a monopoly. 
According to the drafts’ rules, a monopoly exists when a single 
firm controls one-half or more of the relevant market, two firms 
control two-thirds or more of the relevant market, or three firms 
control three-fourths or more of the relevant market.106 Setting 
aside for a moment the otherwise critical issue of defining relevant 
markets, such bright-line rules have many benefits. For example, 
the rules are easily applied to determine which firms wield 
unlawful economic power.107 Once the relevant market is defined, 
determining a violation is merely a matter of calculating a firm’s 
market share and comparing it to the maximum levels allowed 
under the anti-monopoly laws. Because of the ease of calculation 
and measurement, firms could determine ex ante and to a high 
degree of certainty whether their actions violate anti-monopoly 
laws.108 Furthermore, if China’s government desires to regulate 
monopolies in order to prevent corporate power concentrations that 
could eventually undermine its own power, then bright-line anti-
monopoly rules provide a simple approach for restraining foreign 
corporations that may gain too much economic or social power. 
Notwithstanding the early drafts’ apparent benefits, closer 
analysis of the bright-line market-share approach reveals several 
weaknesses. First, properly defining a firm’s relevant market may 
be extremely problematic; how the drafters define a firm’s relevant 
market can determine whether it is a monopoly because a firm’s 
market share in any given market depends primarily on the level of 
 
 
104 See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
105 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
106 See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
108 See id. 
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specificity used to define the market.109 For example, the company 
L’Oréal can be properly characterized as both a general producer of 
cosmetics and a specific producer of mascara, lipstick, or fingernail 
polish. Corporations like L’Oréal that are both general and specific 
producers may hold a dominant position in the overall industry 
(cosmetics, etc.), but may not hold a dominant position in the 
market for any given individual product (mascara, etc.). Thus, in 
determining whether a monopoly exists under the bright-line 
market-share approach, the focus shifts from measuring market 
power to the key issue of defining the relevant market.110  
In theory, determination of a monopoly market share in a 
certain industry involves relatively simple calculations—either a 
firm has reached the threshold levels or it has not. In practice, 
however, any firm accused of exceeding the requisite level of 
market power will likely respond with the argument that regulators 
have improperly defined the firm’s true market. The L’Oréal 
example is particularly illustrative of this trend. A hypothetical 
complaint might allege that L’Oréal’s cosmetics sales amount to 
over fifty percent of the cosmetics market in China. L’Oréal could 
respond that the relevant market is actually that of beauty products, 
which would also include other products such as hair products in 
addition to cosmetics. Under that definition, L’Oréal’s sales might 
then amount to only thirty-seven percent of the market. The 
potential for regulated parties to play with definitions ultimately 
places the burden of determining proper definitions on the 
judiciary—a burden that bright-line rules are specifically designed 
to avoid. 
Furthermore, even if the Chinese government were to establish 
an easy-to-apply rule for defining a market, the bright-line 
approach will likely be over-inclusive and, therefore, ineffective in 
accomplishing the CCP’s goals. For example, assuming that 
Beijing’s true goal is to prevent large concentrations of power in 
the hands of foreign corporations, the bright-line approach might 
prove counterproductive because its application could implicate 
many corporations that pose no threat to the CCP’s power.111 
Admittedly, if an international computer operating system 
manufacturer were to capture eighty percent of the Chinese market, 
 
 
109 See supra notes 79, 82. 
110 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
111 See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
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it could pose a significant threat to the CCP’s power.112 On the 
other hand, it is difficult to imagine an international company with 
eighty percent market share in the yellow wooden pencil industry 
as having the capability to pose an equivalent threat. 
Consequently, it is essential that the legislature clearly define 
the key terms to enable effective enforcement of the anti-monopoly 
laws and to avoid confusion. Further, legislation must include 
practical definitions for relevant markets that are not over-
inclusive. 
 
2. To be effective, the bureaucracies must work together 
 
Within any regulatory scheme, establishing an effective 
enforcement mechanism is vital to achieving the regulation’s 
purposes. The complex structure of China’s government morphs 
regulation and enforcement into complex issues of coordination 
among a dizzying array of bureaus with overlapping authority.113   
With regard to anti-monopoly laws, China’s overlapping 
bureaucracies pose a particularly acute problem.114 For instance, 
three bureaus—MOFCOM, the SAIC, and the NDRC—have 
already claimed responsibility over all or part of the Anti-
Monopoly Law.115 There are some indications that bureaucratic 
infighting plays a factor in the legislation’s delay.116 If these 
indicators are credible, it is unlikely that these three agencies will 
be able to come together to effectively regulate or otherwise 
enforce the Anti-Monopoly Law.117 Therefore, unless Beijing 
establishes an independent agency to oversee anti-monopoly 
regulations, it is likely that the three agencies will maintain their 
jurisdictional claims over anti-monopoly enforcement, thus creating 
a compliance nightmare for both the government and businesses. 
For businesses, dealing with several regulating agencies could 
prove very difficult and costly. With three different agencies 
independently creating guidelines for anti-monopoly regulation, 
businesses would have no choice but to negotiate all three sets of 
inevitably constricting and conflicting guidelines. Businesses 
 
 
112 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
113 CHOW, supra note 1, at 142–43. 
114 See supra notes 81–84, 87 and accompanying text. 
115 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  
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would sit in the unsavory position of following one agency’s set of 
guidelines at the expense of another’s. As a result, firms would 
inevitably run the risk of incurring non-compliance sanctions. 
Firms would also likely face a stifling level of combined oversight 
from all three independent agencies, each zealously regulating and 
pursuing its own unique brand of antitrust violations. 
Having three agencies regulate monopolies also presents the 
government with its own set of vexing issues. Multiple agencies 
independently propagating regulations will inevitably generate 
inconsistencies in interpretation and, ultimately, in enforcement of 
anti-monopoly regulations.118 Such inconsistencies could 
undermine the purposes for originally enacting the law. Conversely, 
the three monopoly-regulating agencies could create a free-rider 
problem. In such a scenario, each of the agencies would expect the 
other two agencies to enforce the anti-monopoly laws and none 
would take action. The resultant free-riding would engender under-
enforcement of anti-monopoly laws.  
One arguable weakness of the free-rider scenario is its 
underlying assumption that individual agencies derive utility from 
not enforcing the law. A more realistic approach recognizes that 
individual agencies derive utility from increases in bureaucratic 
power gained through enforcement. Under this paradigm, the three 
competing bureaucracies would tend to over-enforce anti-monopoly 
regulations, effectively stifling market growth and stemming the 
tide of crucial foreign investment.  
Given the potential problems with bureaucratic overlap and 
free-riding, the most efficient regulatory remedy would be to 
establish a single, independent agency charged with enforcing anti-
monopoly regulations.119 A single, independent agency could 
effectively eliminate competitive enforcement problems by 
consolidating enforcement powers into a centralized entity. Such 
consolidation would also eliminate inconsistent anti-monopoly 
guidelines and facilitate the kind of predictable regulatory 
environment upon which economic growth depends. 
 
3. Consumers must enter the equation 
 
It is troubling to note that consumer interests play such an 
insignificant role in the development of Chinese anti-monopoly 
 
 
118 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra notes 81–84, 87 and accompanying text.  
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law. Because the Chinese government is not popularly elected, its 
responsibility to the general public is tenuous. Accordingly, 
consumer interests rarely translate into policy. Moreover, Chinese 
consumers have little recourse since they cannot remove officials 
who do not act in the consumers’ best interests.  
This is not to say, however, that consumers have nothing to 
gain from China’s proposed antitrust law. Indeed, one of the 
primary purposes of antitrust law is to increase consumer welfare 
by making the market more efficient.120 The ultimate effects of 
monopolies on the market are lower output and higher prices, both 
of which directly impact consumers—whether individuals, 
businesses, or even government.121 
China must develop a means of ensuring that individual 
consumer interests—especially those outside of government and 
business interests—are adequately represented in the processes of 
developing and enforcing anti-monopoly laws. The most obvious 
method of protecting consumer interests is to give consumers a 
democratic voice in China’s government. However, as the Chinese 
government has ruled out true democratization as a matter of 
policy, this solution does not seem feasible. Another possible 
solution involves the formation of a consumer protection agency 
dedicated to representing consumer interests in the adoption and 
enforcement of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law. Such an agency could 
work as a coequal with the agency that possesses jurisdiction over 
antitrust laws to ensure that antitrust law enforcement serve 
consumers’ best interests. In order for the consumer protection 
agency to be effective, it must be directly responsible to consumers. 
Agency accountability, whether accomplished through elections of 
non-partisan representatives or other means, must establish the 
agency’s primary duty to consumers and should include remedies 
for violations of that duty. In the absence of such public 
accountability mechanisms, the agency would quickly become like 
any other Chinese government bureau—acting in its own 
bureaucratic self-interest with little incentive to act otherwise. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
China has taken great steps towards reforming its legal and 
economic systems, but it still needs many more reforms. Although 
 
 
120 See supra notes 54–55, 57–58 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 56, 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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it is slowly progressing towards adopting a comprehensive and 
workable antitrust law, effective antitrust regulation is one step that 
has thus far eluded China. While it seems inevitable that China will 
pass the Submitted Draft, it is unclear whether that law will 
effectively achieve the government’s complex and often conflicting 
antitrust goals.  
As China inches closer to passing antitrust legislation, 
multinationals must continue their vigilance as the law will likely 
reflect the CCP’s historically protectionist tendencies and will 
probably be designed to maintain government control over 
multinationals. Therefore, companies wishing to do business in 
China should expect to face significant legal compliance costs and 
to incur penalties for possible antitrust violations. 
Just as it is foreseeable that Beijing will use the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law to restrain multinationals, it is equally foreseeable 
that Beijing will be disinclined to use the Anti-Monopoly Law as a 
tool for reforming state-owned enterprises, particularly where 
reformation could lead to unemployment. Such selective 
enforcement may allow certain large firms to earn and cultivate 
favor with the government and thus escape regulation. As a result, 
China would continue to have large enterprises with significant 
government ties—a situation the antitrust regulation is supposed to 
alleviate. 
The Anti-Monopoly Law’s effectiveness in achieving any of the 
government’s intended purposes depends largely on how it defines 
key terms in the provisions and whether China’s burgeoning 
bureaucracy can unite in enforcing the law. For China to become a 
significant antitrust jurisdiction, it must adopt a regime that applies 
equally to all enterprises (domestic and foreign) in theory and in 
practice. An independent agency with the power to tackle violations 
when and where they occur must also administer the law. 
Ultimately, the drafting and implementation of antitrust laws must 
be guided by the goal of promoting consumer welfare and 
economic efficiency. Unfortunately, China’s forthcoming anti-
monopoly laws do not appear to be such a regime. 
 
